Thursday, May 29, 2008
Deal Imminent between Israel and Hezbollah
Israel and Hezbollah are once again close to a deal that would bring two kidnapped Israeli soldiers back home. Details of the agreement, negotiated by a German middleman, indicate that the two might not still be alive.
... This time around, the German intelligence service BND is once again playing a vital role."Germany is trusted by both sides because, over the years, it has demonstrated that it is a disinterested and honest broker," Kamel Wazne says of Germany's special role in secret diplomacy in Beirut. Wazne, who is close to Hezbollah, is a commentator much in demand by Western media when it comes to explaining the it. Wazne said: "Germany always did what it promised it would, which has given the country a lot of credibility with Hezbollah.
"When the transfer will actually happen remains unclear. Mahmud Komati, a member of the Hezbollah political bureau, told SPIEGEL ONLINE that the standard practice is for Hassan Nasrallah to personally decide the timing...
Hope in the Levant
The agreement between the Hizbollah-led opposition and the Lebanese government and
the start of indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel run counter to the policies of
the Bush administration, which has been pushing the Lebanese government not to
compromise with Hizbollah and opposes Syrian–Israeli talks. The agreement in Lebanon
was the direct result of negotiations with an organization considered terrorist by the
United States, and came in the wake of Hizbollah-led violence. Talks with Syria, a rogue
country allied with Iran, also fall in the category of “appeasement” according to the
stance taken by President Bush in his May 15 speech to the Knesset. Yet, both
developments carry the promise of progress, decreasing the chances of further conflict
from which nobody would benefit.
The United States should support the new Lebanese president and the government of
national unity. It should encourage the Syrian–Israeli talks—but it should stay out of the
process, allowing Syria, Israel, and Turkey to get on with efforts that have come a
considerable way so far.
Ibrahime Al-Amine, chairman of the board of directors of Lebanon’s independent pro-opposition newspaper Al-Akhbar, wrote yesterday that the formation of the national unity government will be an imminent test of the Doha agreement.
“The discussions among the majority team showed that the faction that supports assigning the position of prime minister to the current prime minister, Fouad Siniora, is not purely local, as it is dominated by foreign factions, as proven by the latest communications with the United States and Saudi Arabia,” he wrote.
Those two countries believe that if Saad Hariri became prime minister this would expose him to a tough test he might not survive at a time before the coming parliamentary elections.
“As for the Lebanese team that supports Siniora, it looks at this issue from the angle that dismissing Siniora will crown the opposition’s triumph, as he has been the constant target for the opposition and Syria’s ire,” Al-Amine wrote.
Will Doha peace last ?
If we look at the point at which the latest developments in Lebanon have reached from our country's perspective, we'll see that Turkey's foreign policy, which has historically opted to stay away from developments in the Middle East and only adopt a Western-oriented perspective, now has a place in a great family picture in which the new Lebanese president is posed between Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa and Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora. Looking at this portrait shows the great transformation undertaken in Turkey's foreign policy and to what extent this transformation has been influential."
And, Shmuel Rosner in Slate, "Will the International community abandon Lebanon?"
...David Welch, felt the need to praise even the most unlikely regimes: "If Syria and Iran have supported that," he said, "then perhaps they will continue to exercise a more constructive role in Lebanon." If he had his fingers crossed behind his back, no one saw. If he winked as he suggested such an improbable outcome, nobody noticed. But Welch knows, as do all the others, that neither Syria nor Iran are suddenly planning to play a "constructive" role in Lebanon. If they support the agreement and the United States also supports it, pretty soon one party is going to look stupid.
...The problem is that the decisions the Lebanese have recently made only increase the likelihood that they will eventually be abandoned by the international community. "There is no contradiction between having a foreign policy that looks at Lebanon as Lebanon and also sees how Lebanon fits into our regional calculations," said Feltman. That is true, unless "Lebanon as Lebanon" makes decisions that render it easier for regional forces to meddle in its affairs. Choosing a pro-Syrian president might be such a decision. Avoiding the question of disarmament might be another such decision...
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
راجعة

راجعة بإذن الله
إذا ما إجا شي من الله
جربنا نتكل عليكن
عدنا اتكلنا ع الله!..
راجعة بإذن الله
على أنحس بإذن الله
لا تفكرها عم تقدّم...
راجعة بإذن الله...
يا بلدٌ يحسدنا اجانب
عا مناخو و عا هواه
يا شعبٌ منقلبٌ حرٌ
كل واحد عايش عا هواه
سامحهم يا أبتاه... يا أبتاه...
طار الملك وطار الشاه
طاروا بعون من الله
صلوا يا عمي صلوا له
ما كانوا طاروا لولاه...
يا جيلٌ قلبو على بلدو
قاعد يظبط بسماه
بلد ظابط مثلما هوي
هيدا هوي.. هيدا إياه
باسم الآب... وبسم الله
بسم الله...
راجعة بإذن الله
ان قلتوا "ايه" وان قلتوا "لا"
ما في رملة بهالصحرا بتُحرُك
إلا بوحي من الله
...
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
Lebanon: Another Bush foreign policy defeat
Augustus Richard Norton, a professor at Boston University and expert on the Middle East, sends this note about the latest developments from Lebanon:
...
If the agreement holds, this is a significant reverse for the United States and for Saudi Arabia, which have both urged the pro-U.S. government to hang tough.
The U.S.-supported Internal Security Force–widely seen in Lebanon as Sunni-dominated gendarmerie–disappeared as soon as the Hezbollah-led opposition forces moved into West Beirut on 7 May. Only in recent days did it reappear well after the clashes ended. As for Saad al-Hariri’s private militia, it simply crumbled...
Doha agreement
- National unity government of 30 ministers (16-11-3 , the opposition got the veto power afterall, it all boils down to the premiership...)
-Electoral law to be signed in the parliament (1960 law and Beirut divided into three parts 10-5-4)
-DT sit-in is lifted. (I guess no armed barracks were found)
New realignments all across the political landscape is expected.
I wouldn't be too optimistic about this settlement, a lot is left hanging but the reshuffling is good since the old status quo is over and a new ball game is set.
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Hollow States: Lebanon
May's dispute between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah is an interesting example of the contest between hollow states and virtual states over legitimacy and sovereignty. As in most conflicts between gutted nation-states and aggressive virtual states, Hezbollah's organic legitimacy trumped the state's in the contest (an interesting contrast between voluntary affiliation and default affiliation by geography). The fighting was over in six hours.
A Parallel Communications Backbone
What's more interesting than the actual fighting is what the conflict was about. In summary, the government made an attempt to slow the expansion Hezbollah's fiber optics network, which provides secure/robust communications and surveillance (via automated cameras) to the group. Specifically, the government tried to shut down surveillance nodes of the network overlooking Beirut International Airport. Hezbollah responded by defining the network as a core part of its organization and that they were willing to defend it with violence if necessary.
So, we can now conclude that in addition to a 4GW militia and social services, a parallel communications/surveillance network is a core feature set of virtual states. This tracks with our emerging experience in Sadr City. It also implies we may see interesting virtual variants of this via the parasitic piggybacking of open source insurgencies (the PCC, al Qaeda, etc.) on cell phone networks and the Internet.
Friday, May 16, 2008
What's driving Lebanon's crisis?
...By demanding the dismantling of the communications network, the government would be removing the main defense network for Hezbollah. Even the Israeli government, in its report examining the July 2006 war, declared that if it had not been for the secure communications networks of Hezbollah, it would have been able to infiltrate the communications, and Hezbollah would not have been able to achieve a military victory...
...By demanding the dismantling of the communications network, the government would be opening avenues for the Israelis and for other agents to assassinate the Hezbollah leadership. Clearly, this would not have been acceptable to Hezbollah in any way, shape or form...
...This U.S. government, supported by the New York Times and the Washington Post, continues to look at the Lebanese government as democratic, when according to the Times, literally half the Lebanese population took to the streets to demand the resignation of the government. The U.S. government and the corporate media have lost their legitimacy to condemn any coup d'etat in Lebanon...
WHAT IS Hezbollah's economic program?
The problem is that Hezbollah is aligned in the opposition with the Free Patriotic Movement, a Christian party under the leadership of Gen. Michel Aoun. His economic program is to the right of the government's. He believes in neoliberalism, in privatization. His only positive claim is that he is against corruption.
When I asked Hezbollah members about their economic platform, they told me that they have been working on it for months, but aren't ready to disclose it.
Hezbollah doesn't have a pro-union history. But it does have a history of support for the poor, based on what it has done institutionally in the South. It has been able to build a very effective social network...
...No matter how powerful and how legitimate, Hezbollah is within a national resistance movement. They are not the left, and they are not calling for a secular government--and we have yet to see if they would be working for the kind of economic justice we envision...Al Qaeda in Lebanon
Fertile ground for recruitment in West Bekaa and Ain-el-Helwe camp according to Sobhi Monzer Yaghi in Annahar.
Thursday, May 15, 2008
Fath el Islam,... Again
In an indirect reference to Shiite Hezbollah group, Fatah al-Islam said in a statement what happened in Beirut, "the killing, burning and humiliation to our Sunni people is not justified or accepted."
"Anyone who wants to bow the heads of our people in Beirut" will be confronted even if the price is "blood shed," the statement said.
----------------------------------------------
It is interesting to see how the tone of the Fei statement and its rhetorics sound like most of what Hariri Inc has been broadcasting.
Tuesday-----14:42
Al-Jazeera's Ghassan Ben Jeddo, "a deal is very likely to be sealed between the two factions in Lebanon including a 10-10-10 formula for a national unity government and Suleiman to be elected before the 10th of next month... everybody moving to Qatar for more talks..."
Add to that, "March 14"'s Safadi, "dialogue is essential to find a new formula since the Taef agreement proved to be insufficient by practice and some aspects of it needs to be reviewed."
AND, Joumblat's possible letter to Nasrallah, "the Jabal and Beirut will fully support the resistance, and our feud is temporary."
Meanwhile, it seems that Gemayel's Kataeb and Geagea's Lebanese forces seem to be stuck in last week's act.
Pour les habitants de Tripoli, la guerre civile «n’est pas finie»
A Bab al-Tebbeneh, la population, qui soutient massivement la majorité parlementaire et son leader sunnite, Saad Hariri, dit espérer une solution politique, mais affirme qu’elle ne laissera pas le Hezbollah chiite renverser la donne en sa faveur. «S’il nous impose son pouvoir par la force, nous répliquerons par la force», répètent en boucle les résidents du quartier où le Parti de Dieu, considéré pendant longtemps comme la «résistance» libanaise, est désormais qualifié de parti du diable. «Il a ouvert la porte de la division confessionnelle, jette Haytham, propriétaire d’une épicerie. Il a humilié les sunnites dans la capitale. Nous espérons qu’il a compris qu’il jouait avec le feu et qu’il reviendra à de meilleures intentions. Sinon, ce sera la guerre. Nous nous organiserons et nous le combattrons.»
Cause jihadiste. Réunis dans un garage, un groupe de sunnites fondamentalistes, pistolets à la ceinture affirme : «Hariri, c’est notre leader, nous le respectons et nous le soutenons. Maintenant, lui, c’est l’option gentille. S’il échoue, nous avons une autre option qui s’appelle Ben Laden.» Des jeunes du quartier ont déjà embrassé la cause jihadiste, un certain nombre d’entre eux ayant même rejoint le groupe Fatah al-Islam, qui a combattu l’armée libanaise l’été dernier dans le camp palestinien de Nahr el-Bared. «Nous dansons sur un volcan ici, dit encore Khaled. Personne ne veut que le pays replonge dans le chaos, mais il faut vraiment trouver une solution acceptable par tout le monde le plus rapidement possible.»
Falling Cedars: Fomenting War in Lebanon -- and Beyond
Chris Floyd, Here
What's going on in Lebanon? Nothing you haven't seen before -- in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Palestine and other places where "the United States is basically instigating and funding civil wars." So says Professor As’ad AbuKhalil.
In fact, "our friends" in Lebanon are actually in league with our allegedly erstwhile friends Al Qaeda. The Hariri faction backed by the Bush Administration is drawing upon the most extremist Sunni armed factions in an attempt to counteract the power of Shiite Hezbollah. This is of course just a continuation of current American strategy in the region, as Sy Hersh outlined last year: giving arms and money to extremist Sunni groups allied with al Qaeda in order to ward off Shiite factions making trouble in our client regimes.
This in turn is part of a broader, more long-standing strategy, going back to 2004, as we noted in a recent report: a global program of arming and funding militias and other violent "non-state actors" to foment trouble where Washington wants trouble, and pressure recalcitrant regimes to bend to the imperial will.
And no, Washington is not "behind" every twist and turn in Middle East politics. But American interventions, direct and covert, are responsible for exacerbating and intensifying conflicts, enflaming sectarian and ethnic divides (or literally building giant concrete walls between them, as in Baghdad today), bolstering tyrannical and/or ineffectual, illegitimate leaders whose misrule provoke more strife, suffering and conflict.
UPDATE: And now Bush is proposing an even more direct U.S. military intervention in Lebanon. Speaking in Cairo -- on yet another one of his pointless trots* around the cauldron (maybe he wants another fancy sword -- or just some more good smoochin' -- from the Saudi king) -- Bush offered to help the Lebanese army "respond more effectively" to Hezbollah. He also took the opportunity to -- what else? -- blame Iran for everything happening in Lebanon, claiming that without the backing of the devilish Persians, Hezbollah -- which, as AbuKhalil noted, is supported by almost half of the Lebanese population -- would be "powerless."
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Governmental decrees cancelled
Lebanon reaches out for international help
Minister Mouawad casually catching up with her friends in a rally at Harissa in 2006, traffic was thick on narrow mountainous curves. One has to be practical. Borzou Daragahi in the LA Times,
...Shaken by a Hezbollah military offensive in recent days, Lebanon's pro-Western parties have launched an intensive campaign to lobby allies in Washington, Europe and the Arab world to intervene diplomatically or even militarily on their behalf, officials here said.
But there was little sign Monday that the West was prepared to intervene.
... The coalition of pro-Western Christian, Sunni and Druze politicians under the so-called March 14 banner has embarked on an effort to draw international backers into the conflict, said coalition leaders and Western diplomats. They fear Hezbollah is trying to use its military strength to cow the government into submitting to its demands, which include noninterference with the militia's drive to build up its arsenal to confront Israel.
The coalition's arguments appear aimed at playing on Western and Arab officials' fears of growing Iranian power. The Lebanese officials want other countries to pressure Iran and its ally, Syria, by seeking condemnation of and perhaps new economic sanctions against the two nations at the U.N. Security Council.
One official went so far as to suggest unspecified attacks on Damascus, the Syrian capital, to punish Hezbollah's backer and restore a regional balance of power...
"Iran took a decision to take Lebanon hostage, and from Lebanon, come back to the Mediterranean Sea to be able to infiltrate much more easily the whole Arab world," said another official, Nayla Mouawad, a minister in the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. "It is very obvious that we're not getting a clear-cut reaction from the U.S., Arabs and the international community which is sufficient to the gravity of the situation."
But despite words of support from Washington, there was little sign it would forcefully rescue its Lebanese allies. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut did not respond to an interview request.
"The Americans are telling March 14 they have to resist," said one Western diplomat in Beirut. "But they're not bringing much operational support."
"We're not asking them to fight our fight for us," said Mouawad, the minister. "But at least don't let us be slaughtered by total indifference."
_______________________
It is to be noted, that geostrategic expert/minister Mouawad was safely pampered in her lofty residence during the whole short conflict that took place and I'm sure that her safety was not compromised during that time.
Briefing on Beirut (at the NAF)
You can download the audio HERE.
Panel:
- Rami Khouri (by phone)
Editor-at-Large
The Daily Star
- Hisham Melhem
Bureau Chief
Al Arabiyah
- Nir Rosen (by phone)
Former Fellow, New America Foundation
Fellow, NYU Center on Law and Security
- Daniel Levy
Director, Middle East Policy Initiative, New America Foundation/The Century Foundation
Publisher, www.ProspectsforPeace.com
- Steven Clemons
Director, American Strategy Program, New America Foundation
Publisher, www.TheWashingtonNote.com
- Flynt Leverett
Director, Geopolitics of Energy Initiative
New America Foundation
Interesting exchange, certainly worth a careful look.
Rami Khoury has good ideas for resolving the conflict which he expressed before in an article.
Hisham Melhem basically conveyed the Hariri Inc. point of view. And he does not mince his words.
Nir Rosen provided excellent reporting from Beirut (by phone); especially about Hariri's recruiting, training and arming militias in his constituency.
Flynt Leverett says
"one of the biggest mistakes of the Bush administration in the Middle East is that in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik Hariri in February 2005 to lash on to the so-called Cedar revolution to leverage the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, to leverage pressure on the regime through the International tribunal and to leverage the "Lebanese democracy". It was a colossal mistake for three reasons:
1- Let us not be overly romantic, Lebanon in the post-Hariri period is not a true democracy, it is a political order rooted in the distribution of political assets along sectarian lines and the patterns of distribution are way out of whack with demographic reality particularly with regard to the Shiia. The last conversation in the world the March 14 would like to have is about "one man, one vote".
2- I said it was a mistake because the Lebanese arena is, at best, a side-show in terms of America's real strategic interests and to use the Lebanese "democracy" for not engaging strategically with Syria and Iran is the height of strategic malpractice as far as I'm concerned for the American administration.
3- It's a mistake because, it does not work, what we did is basically what we did in the early eighties; we took of bunch of western-oriented Lebanese political actors whom we liked because they basically looked like us, talked like us, seemed to push all the right buttons for us in terms of what their political values were, and then we arrayed them against people who have real street credit. The results in the eighties were disastrous and the results now are proving to be very, very bad for US interest in the region. The Syrian regime is more strongly entrenched, more powerful and more influential, certainly Iranian influence strongly increased over the last three years and this policy was a colossal failure. Unfortunately this policy enjoyed strong bipartisan support...
It is a foreign policy based on illusion rather than one based on sober assessment on the ground reality and a clear understanding of what America's interests are. And to the extent that we are going to continue to try to play this game with the so-called March 14 coalition, it is going to contribute to further erosion of American standing and influence in this part of the region and if we should be ever foolish enough to think like in the eighties we can intervene by putting American military on the ground, the outcome will be the same as the eighties, many good soldiers and personnel will loose their lives for no good reason. "
Daniel Levy says,
I'm not sure we do anyone any great favors or capture the moral highground by fating the likes of Samir Geagea and Walid Jumblat here in Washington.
I guess my starting point is, why did this happen, why NOW. It must that the government was cognoscente that going after the head of security and the phone lines would not be met with indifference and passivity on the part of the opposition and Hezbollah and i guess two red lines were crossed in the last week; the first line being of the phone network, part of the infrastructure of the Hezbollah resistance, the second red line was Hezbollah using its weapons inwards...
Perhaps someone like Walid Jumblat who certaily led this charge was keen to start the confrontation on the behest of outside forces to suggest that they need more support. Some reports suggested that some people here said "if you don't want us to sit up the rest of 2008 with a Lebanese deadlock, we need a dramatic demonstration of why the current standoff is so problematic. I say that as a background to the following:
Israel needs a pretext, and Hezbollah provided one. And Hezbollah needed to flex its muscles and the pretext was there. My fear is, that when walking on thin ice, we're not in an ice-thickening place. I'm not sure this does generate a solution to the problems and move on to another page...
... There's a real skepticism in Israel towards the March 14 movement and they are seeking a new address, maybe through Syria.
Crise libanaise et intoxication médiatique
...De quoi s’agit-il en dernière analyse ? Si on prenait la peine de reprendre le fil des évènements depuis le début, on s’apercevrait aisément que le véritable « coup de force » provient de cette même « majorité » gouvernementale qui crie aujourd’hui au « coup de force » du Hezbollah !
En effet, la double décision gouvernementale de mettre fin à la mission d’un responsable sécuritaire proche du Hezbollah en poste à l’aéroport international de Beyrouth et la mise hors la loi d’un réseau de télécommunications de 100 000 lignes appartenant au même Hezbollah, outre qu’elle souffre d’un vice de forme puisqu’elle touche à une question sécuritaire nationale qui devrait réunir le consensus intercommunautaire, apparaît comme une action préventive et délibérée en vue d’atteindre un double objectif tactique d’une gravité avérée si on l’analysait du point de la sécurité nationale libanaise : d’une part, le limogeage du responsable proche du Hezbollah vise directement à faire de l’aéroport de Beyrouth une plate-forme ouverte aux agissements des services de sécurité américains (et donc israéliens). D’autre part, la neutralisation du réseau de télécommunications du Hezbollah vise à priver ce dernier d’une capacité de communication autonome, déterminante en cas de conflit avec Israël...
...Ce que les médias occidentaux et certains médias arabes oublient de rappeler, c’est que la « souveraineté » de l’Etat libanais dont ils se servent comme un cache-sexe est avant tout mise à mal par l’interventionnisme américain et européen dans les affaires intérieures du Liban...
...Moralement, il est indéfendable de comploter contre le Hezbollah qui représente la seule force qui a libéré le sud du pays de l’occupation israélienne, qui a résisté magnifiquement à l’agression israélienne de l’été 2006 et qui a de fait sauvé l’honneur arabe dans une bataille pourtant largement disproportionnée. Mais même tactiquement, ce n’est pas en s’alliant aux Américains que les dirigeants sunnites arriveraient à se défaire d’une supposée hégémonie politique du Hezbollah...